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THE CHANGING PROBABILITY OF A MONETARY





The response of Federal Reserve policymakers and financial market participants
to news about the U.S. economy has varied over time.1 Not only have the relevant
economic indicators changed from one monetary policy regime to another, but the
frequency with which the Fed has responded to news about the indicators has fallen
over the past decade.2 In the economic literature, numerous studies have investi-
gated the intertemporal effects of various unanticipated announcements on interest
rates and whether and how monetary policy rules have changed.3 The empirical
evidence from these studies indicates that, during the nonborrowed reserve period
when the Federal Reserve targeted the money stock, news about an unanticipated
increase in the money supply resulted in an increase in interest rates. After 1983,
when the monetary aggregates were deemphasized, news about real activity and
inflation dominated the effects of unanticipated money announcements on interest
rates. An unexpected increase in nonfarm payroll employment, for example, resulted
in an increase in interest rates, while a positive money surprise had little or no
effect. In this literature, the policy anticipations hypothesis is the most widely ac-
cepted explanation for the positive relation between the response of interest rates
and news about money or employment. According to this hypothesis, interest rates
rise and the dollar appreciates as agents revise their expectations upward for the
federal funds rate path in the face of a positive, unanticipated announcement.4
However, over the recent decade, the frequency of adjustment in the funds tar-
get has declined noticeably. For example, from March 1984 through March 1991, the
funds target was altered at least once per month in 58 out of 85 months (68 percent);
from April 1991 through January 2002, the target was changed in only 39 out of 130
months (30 percent) [Rudebusch, 1995; Kuttner, 2001]. Since Fed policymakers have
an information advantage over financial market participants, (that is, they have
perfect information regarding the FOMC’s policy stance and its economic forecasts
are superior to those of the private sector [Romer and Romer, 2000]), it is natural to
ask: Is the evolution in Fed behavior due to the fact that there is less news? Or is the
Fed responding less to the news? Moreover, if the link between news about current
economic activity and the subsequent adjustment in the funds target has weakened,566 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
has the response of market interest rates to the news also changed as the policy
anticipations hypothesis would imply? These questions are addressed in this paper.
It is found that employment announcements are significantly linked to monetary
policy behavior over March 1984–March 1991 and April 1991–January 2002, while
inflation announcements are unrelated. However, the mean absolute value of the
magnitude of employment announcements declines by 24 percent in the latter pe-
riod and the probability of no change in the funds target more than doubles in going
from the first sub-sample to the second. This sluggishness in policy is mirrored in the
Treasury bill market; over the second sub-period employment surprises play little if
any role in explaining fluctuations in the bill rate. Hence, there is in some sense less
news and the Fed is responding less to the news. It is suggested that the increased
reluctance on the part of Fed policymakers to change the funds target is a reflection
of the uncertainties associated with the nature of the incoming data which contra-
dicted the predictions of core models such as the natural rate hypothesis.
THE CHANGING PROBABILITY OF A MONETARY POLICY RESPONSE
TO ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT EMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION
To investigate the changing probability of a response by Fed policymakers to
economic announcements about inflation and employment and the changing rel-
evance of these announcements in the conduct of monetary policy, a policy reaction
function is estimated over the current Fed funds targeting operating procedure, which
is divided at the trough of the 1990-91 recession into two sub-sample periods: March
1984–March 1991 and April 1991–January 2002.
In this estimation, the response by Fed policymakers to these announcements is
measured by discrete changes in the funds target. Since changes in the funds target
are infrequent and appear in clusters over the business cycle, a limited-dependent
variable technique is employed in this analysis as in Vanderhart [2000]. More spe-
cifically, since the changes in target can be ordered from large decrease to large
increase, an ordinal probit estimation is employed, whereby the dependent variable,
Yt , takes on one of the following values that reflect the size of the total change in the
funds target over month t: Yt = 1, decrease of more than 25 basis points; Yt = 2,
decrease of less than or equal to 25 basis points; Yt = 3, no change in target; Yt = 4,
increase of less than or equal to 25 basis points; Yt = 5, increase of more than 25 basis
points.5
The independent variables are monthly, real-time data as it became available to
Fed policymakers in month t: initial, unrevised announced changes in M2, the per-
cent change in the producer price index (PPI), and nonfarm payroll employment.
Over the March 1984–March 1991 sub-sample, inflation is represented by changes
in M2, the monetary aggregate that was given the most weight by Fed policymakers
in the post-nonborrowed reserve period; over April 1991–January 2002, PPI announce-
ments replace M2, since the relation between M2, interest rates and output broke
down in the early 1990s.6 In each case, the announcements that are released in
month t reflect economic activity over the previous calendar month (t 1). (For more
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In this model, the probability that Yt = j, j = 1, . . 5, is expressed as:
(1) PR(Yt =  j) =  ( j    'xt)    ( j 1     'xt)
where   represents the cumulative normal distribution function, the  ’s are esti-
mated threshold values, the   vector contains the estimated coefficients and xt vector
contains employment and M2 or PPI announcements for month t. Intuitively, if  'xt
+  t is between  j 1 and  j, the Fed chooses Yt = j. The probability that the Fed
chooses j is the probability that  'xt +  t is between the threshold values,  j 1 and  j.7
(Appendix B displays the probabilities associated with each of the 5 policy choices
and the corresponding log likelihood function that is estimated.)
The results of the ordinal probit estimations are provided in Table 1. The coeffi-
cients or maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) do not have the same interpretation
as ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients. While an OLS regression
coefficient represents the effect of a unit change in an independent variable on the
TABLE 1
The Probability of a Change in the Federal Funds Target
A. Ordinal Probit Estimation Results
1984:03 - 1991:03 1991:04 - 2002:01
Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic)
 M2 ($Billion) 0.003 (0.27)
 Employment (100’s of Thous.) 0.215 (3.16) 0.355 (5.39)
% PPI 0.065 (0.24)
 1  0.603 (2.37)  1.325 (6.78)
 2 0.050 (0.20)  0.545 (3.68)
 3 1.002 (3.81) 1.914 (9.10)
 4 1.889 (6.28) 2.486 (9.68)
The coefficient on  Employment was tested for structural change in going from the first sub-sample to the
second; the null hypothesis (no structural change) was not rejected (t-statistic = 0.48 on the differential
slope coefficient). In addition, the Wald test was used to determine if the coefficients in each regression are
simultaneously equal to zero (null). Test results yielded  2 (2) = 48.37 and 82.2 over each period, respec-
tively. Given that the critical value  2 (2) = 9.2 (1 percent), the null was rejected.
B. Probabilities (Percent)
1984:03 - 1991:03 1991:04 - 2002:01
Pr(Yt = 1, Decrease: > 25 bp) 12.3 2.3
Pr(Yt  = 2, Decrease:   25 bp) 18.4 8.9
Pr(Yt  = 3, No Change) 36.6 78.1
Pr(Yt  = 4, Increase:   25 bp) 23.6 7.2
Pr(Yt  = 5, Increase: > 25 bp) 9.1 3.4
The probabilities were calculated using mean absolute values of the independent variables, which are dis-
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dependent variable, a MLE represents a variable’s influence on the probability of
each of the policy choices, (Pr(Yt = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)). In these estimations, the coefficient
on the announced change in employment ( Employment) has the greatest influence
compared to the coefficients on the announced change in M2 ( M2) and the percent
change in the PPI (% PPI), which are smaller and statistically insignificant. The
positive sign on the employment coefficient implies large increases in nonfarm pay-
roll employment were more likely to result in an increase in the funds target rather
than a decrease.8
 To focus on the heterogeneity of Fed behavior within the current policy regime,
the probabilities associated with each of the 5 policy choices were calculated using
the estimated coefficients, threshold parameters and the mean absolute values of
the explanatory variables over each sub-sample period (formulas are displayed in
Appendix B). In going from the March 1984–March 1991 to the April 1991–January
2002 sub-sample, the probabilities associated with changing the funds target, Pr(Yt
= 1, 2, 4, 5), decline by more than half, while the probability of no change in the
target more than doubles from 37 percent to 78 percent (see Table 1, part B). In
addition, the amount of news, in terms of the magnitude of the announced change in
the right-hand side variables has declined. In going from the first sub-sample to the
second, the mean absolute value of the change in employment, for example, declines
by 24 percent (see Table 2). Hence, while there is in some sense less news, policymakers
have responded less to the news.9
Gavin and Mandal [2000] show that, beginning in 1994, incoming data were
giving policymakers “mixed signals”. More specifically, the data were yielding nega-
tive inflation errors, implying actual inflation was less than predicted, and positive
output errors, implying actual output was greater than expected. As a result, the
incoming data of the 1990s contradicted the predictions of core models such as the
natural rate hypothesis (that is, output growth beyond potential is inflationary) and
the Taylor Rule (predicts the fed funds rate is a simple function of the real interest
rate, the output gap and inflation away from the Federal Open Market Committee’s
target), and called into question the relevance of these models and the reliability and
accuracy of measures of the natural rate of output and employment likely to trigger




1984:03 - 1991:03 1991:04 - 2002:01
Mean Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev.
 M2 ($Billion) 13.57 8.46 12.43 11.65
 Employment 2.38 1.20 1.82 1.22
    (100’s of Thous.)
% PPI 0.40 0.37 0.31 0.26569 CHANGING PROBABILITY OF A MONETARY POLICY RESPONSE
As Taylor himself has pointed out, these types of formulations are at
best “guideposts” to help central banks, not inflexible rules that elimi-
nate discretion. One reason is that their formulation depends on the
values of certain key variables—most crucially the equilibrium real
federal funds rate and the production potential of the economy. In
practice these have been obtained by observation of past macroeco-
nomic behavior—either through informal inspection of the data, or
more formally as embedded in models. In that sense, like all rules, as
I noted earlier, they embody a forecast that the future will be like the
past. Unfortunately, however, history is not an infallible guide to the
future, and the levels of these two variables are currently under ac-
tive debate. [1997]
Policymakers therefore assigned less weight to the output gap, for example, in policy
reaction functions because of the confusing nature of the incoming data. In this
study, this change in the conduct of monetary policy is manifested by an increase in
the probability of no change in the funds target in response to employment announce-
ments.10
THE RESPONSE OF THE 3-MONTH TREASURY BILL TO THE NEWS
The purpose of this section is to determine if the change in probability of a policy
change over the 1990s is mirrored in the way financial market participants responded
to economic announcements. This is accomplished by estimating the following equa-
tions using OLS over the March 1984–March 1991 and April 1991–January 2002
sub-samples, respectively:
(2)  INt = b0 + b1Mt 1
u  + b2Et
u + εt
(3)  INt = b0 + b2Et
u  + b3PPIt
u + εt
In the above,  INt  represents the change in the 3-month Treasury bill rate (in basis
points) from market close on day t-1 to market close on day t, Mt 1
u  is the unantici-
pated change in the money stock (announcements occur on t 1 after market close),
Et
u  is the unanticipated change in nonfarm payroll employment and PPIt
u is unan-
ticipated growth in the PPI (the latter two announcements occur before the market
opens at time t).11 In each case, these independent variables are constructed by tak-
ing the difference of the announced change in money, employment and the PPI from
the expected change, where the market’s expectations for the change in money, em-
ployment and the PPI are obtained from survey data collected by MMS Interna-
tional. (See the Appendix A for a detailed description of the data and the construc-
tion of the variables employed below.)
Table 3 shows the estimation results for equations (2) and (3). Consistent with
most earlier findings (see note 3), unanticipated M2 and PPI are not statistically
significant over each sub-sample. In sharp contrast, however, is the behavior of the570 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
coefficient on unanticipated employment, b2. Over March 1984–March 1991, the pa-
rameter estimate of b2 indicates that an unanticipated increase of 100,000 in non-
farm payrolls resulted in a 5 basis-point increase in the T-bill rate (t-statistic = 7.46).
Over the subsequent sample period, April 1991–January 2002, however, the results
indicate employment report surprises were largely disregarded by financial market
participants: b2 is less than half of its previous estimated value, and is not statisti-
cally significant. Since this lack of significance corresponds with the dramatic in-
crease in the probability of no change in the funds target, the inference is, unantici-
pated employment announcements received less attention in financial markets be-
cause they no longer had much value in anticipating future monetary policy actions.
CONCLUSION
The change in the conduct of monetary policy over the 1990s appears to corre-
spond with the fact that incoming data on output and inflation were inconsistent
with the predictions of core models such as the natural rate hypothesis. In this pa-
per, the uncertainties in this environment are manifested by the increase in prob-
ability of no change in the funds target in response to employment announcements
and, in the OLS regressions of the change in the T-bill rate on unanticipated employ-
ment and inflation, a lack of significance in the coefficient on unanticipated employ-
ment over April 1991–January 2002. As the policy anticipations hypothesis would
imply, financial market participants ceased to respond to employment report sur-
prises, because they no longer had much value in anticipating future monetary policy
actions.
TABLE 3
Response of the Treasury Bill Rate to the “News”
Sample Period b0 b1 b2 b3 R
—
2 SEE DW N
 TBt = b0 + b1Mt 1
u  + b2Et
u + εt
03/84 - 03/91  0.89  0.25 5.25 0.171 8.09 1.91 271
(1.80) (1.43) (7.46)
 TBt = b0 + b2Eu
t  + b3PPIu
t  + εt
04/91 – 01/02 1.81 2.62 0.98  0.002 32.95 1.99 425
(1.13) (1.07) (0.10)
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; N is the number of usable observations in the regression; DW
is the Durbin-Watson test statistic. These estimations were examined for heteroskedasticity using White’s
test. In each case, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity could not be rejected at the   = 5% level.571 CHANGING PROBABILITY OF A MONETARY POLICY RESPONSE
APPENDIX A
Interest Rates: Daily, 3-month Treasury bill rates (adjusted to constant maturity) and monthly, federal
funds rates (effective) from the Federal Reserve’s H.15 historical data bank at http://www.federalreserve.gov.
Money Announcements: Change in the unrevised level of M2, in billions of dollars, as reported in the Fed-
eral Reserve’s H.6 release. The announced level of M2 reflects the daily average level of M2 over the previ-
ous calendar month.
Employment Announcements: Change in nonfarm payroll employment (hundreds of thousands) over the
previous calendar month reported by the U.S. Department of Labor in the Employment Situation on the
first Friday of every month.
PPI Announcements: Percent change in the PPI index from the previous month reported by the U.S. De-
partment of Labor monthly.
Expected Change in Money and the PPI: Obtained from Money Market Services International over the full
sample period.
Expected Change in Employment: Obtained from Money Market Services from 1985 through January 2002.
Expectations for employment announcements from October 1977 through 1984 are unavailable. They were
computed as in Cook and Korn [1991], which involves (1) estimating an autoregressive time series model
using revised historical nonfarm payroll employment from January 1960 through September 1977 and (2)
computing the market’s expectations for the change in employment ( et
e) using the estimated coefficients of
the model and the initial (i.e., unrevised) release, as reported in the Wall Street Journal on the day imme-
diately following the announcement, for  et 1, i = 1 to 3, to represent agents’ information sets just prior to
the announcement at time t. The estimated coefficients of the autoregressive model (t statistics are in
parentheses) are the following:
 et
e, = 39.79 + 0.22  et 1 + 0.31  et 2 + 0.20  et 3
           (2.85)   (3.26)           (4.60)         (2.96)
where the number of lags was determined by statistical significance of the coefficients and properties of the
residuals ( R
2  = 0.33).
Cook and Korn compared expectations for the employment report that were generated with an
autoregressive model against MMS survey expectations available after 1985. They find the expectations
computed with the autoregressive model yield somewhat lower response coefficients when regressing the
change in interest rates on unanticipated employment but the level of significance of the coefficients and
R
2  of the regressions are roughly the same.
Unanticipated Money Announcements, Mt
u, are defined as unanticipated M2, the aggregate which was
given the greatest weight by the FOMC from October 1982 and through the early 1990s. More information
about M2 announcements is available in Kearney [1996].
Unexpected Employment Announcements, Et
u are based on the change in nonfarm payroll employment
(hundreds of thousands) over the previous month which is released by the U.S. Dept. of Labor in the Em-
ployment Situation on the first Friday of every month.
Unexpected PPI Announcements, PPIt
u are based on the percent change in the PPI over the previous month
which is released by the U.S. Department of Labor.572 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
APPENDIX B
In the probit estimation, the dependent variable, Yt  , takes on one of the following values that reflect
the size of the total change in the funds target over month t: Yt = 1, decrease of more than 25 basis points;
Yt  = 2, decrease of less than or equal to 25 basis points; Yt = 3, no change in target; Yt  = 4, increase of less
than or equal to 25 basis points; Yt  = 5, increase of more than 25 basis points.
In this model, the probability that Yt  = j, j = 1,...5, is expressed as:
(4) PR(Yt = j) =  (  j      'xt)    (  j 1      'xt)
where   represents the cumulative normal distribution function, the  ’s are estimated threshold values,
the   vector contains the estimated coefficients and xt vector contains employment and M2 or PPI an-
nouncements in month t.
Accordingly, the probabilities associated with each of the 5 policy choices are listed below:
PR(Yt = 1) =  (  1      'xt)
PR(Yt = 2) =  ( 2      'xt)    (  1      'xt)
PR(Yt = 3) =  ( 3      'xt)    (  2      'xt)
PR(Yt =4) =  ( 4      'xt)    (  3      'xt)
PR(Yt = 5) =  (  'xt    4)
The log likelihood estimation that corresponds with the probabilities defined above consists of:






log ( ) log[ ( ) ∑∑ − ′ − ΦΦ α β ( () ] j1 t       x   − − ′ α β
whereby the maximum likelihood estimate of the   coefficients reflects the explanatory variables’ influence
on the probability of a given response by Fed policymakers. (See Vanderhart [2000] and Maddala [1983] for
more information.)
NOTES
I am indebted to Raymond E. Lombra for his insightful comments and suggestions that greatly im-
proved the quality of this effort. I would also like to thank the three anonymous referees for their
helpful comments.
1. Typically, “news” refers to what is unanticipated or unexpected. From the perspective of financial
market participants, “news” refers to the difference between an announcement of, say, the change in
employment and the market’s expectation; from policymakers’ perspective, “news” refers to the gap
between the economic release and the Federal Reserve’s forecast.
2. As explained in Lombra [1994], the terms “operating procedure,” “policy rule,” and “policy regime” can
in practice be used interchangeably. A change in “policy rule” refers to a change in the degree to which
the intermediate targets, e.g., the monetary aggregates, are adjusted when final goal variables, e.g.,
GDP and inflation, deviate from desired values. A change in “operating procedure” (e.g., to nonborrowed
reserves) affects the degree to which policy instruments (for example, open market operations) are
adjusted in response to deviations of intermediate target variables from a prespecified target. As de-
tailed in Heller [1988], a change in operating procedure has usually also involved an accompanying
change in policy rule/regime.
3. For more information about the impact of money and employment announcements on asset prices see
Sheehan and Wohar [1995], Kearney [2002], Cook and Korn [1991], Ederington and Lee [1993], Moorthy
[1995], Santomero [1991], Hardouvelis [1987] and the references cited therein. Also, for a comprehen-573 CHANGING PROBABILITY OF A MONETARY POLICY RESPONSE
sive investigation and review of changes in interest rate rules over the pre- versus post-nonborrowed
reserve reserve targeting period, see Fair [2000] and references cited therein.
4. Two alternative hypotheses offered to explain the rise in interest rates, and most often refuted by the
data, are the expected inflation hypothesis: i.e., inflation expectations increase in the face of a positive,
unanticipated money announcement because the Fed is expected to accommodate; and the real activ-
ity hypothesis: i.e., real rates are expected to rise because unanticipated money and employment an-
nouncements reflect strong real economic growth. A thorough examination and review of these hy-
potheses is beyond the scope of this paper. For more information, see Moorthy [1995], Cook and Korn
[1991], Engel and Frankel [1984], Santomero [1991], Sheehan and Wohar [1995] and the references
cited therein.
5. The advantage of this approach to investigating changes in Fed policy is that it directly examines the
link between adjustments in the fed funds target rate and economic announcements and circumvents
the problems associated with estimating a proxy for an optimal policy rule that is necessary in testing
for structural change in the coefficients. For more insight see Fair [2000].
6. After the FOMC ceased to target M1, it assigned the most weight to M2 which had exhibited a stable
relation with output and interest rates from the early 1960s. However, in the early 1990s, this relation
broke down and M2 was deemphasized by Fed policymakers. For more information, see Greenspan
[1996, 1997] and Meulendyke [1998].
7. In this estimation,  t is assumed to be normally distributed. For more information, see Vanderhart
[2000], Greene [2000], Davidson and MacKinnon [1993], Terza [1985], Doan [2000].
8. As in Vanderhart [2000], the coefficient on the percent change in the PPI is significant over the late
1980s and early 1990s. However, in this study, this coefficient does not remain significant over the rest
of the 1990s as in Vanderhart. It appears these results are dependent upon the composition of the
independent variables contained in the various estimations. Whatever the explanation, my core find-
ings are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of a proxy for inflation.
9. As one of the referees correctly points out, a separate but relevant question is whether changes in M2
and employment have been less correlated with the Fed’s ultimate goals of inflation and sustainable
growth over the current policy regime. This question will be the topic of future research.
10. For more information, see the “New Challenges For Monetary Policy”, A symposium sponsored by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, August, 1999.
11. Cook and Hahn [1989] have investigated the influence of changes in the federal funds target on inter-
est rates. More specifically, over the September 1974 to September 1979 sample period, the 3-month T-
bill increased by 55 basis points on the day of a target change while longer term Treasuries responded
by less. Since the 3-month Treasury bill rate is more sensitive to changes in the funds target, it is
employed in this analysis.
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